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AT THE WATER’S EDGE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS 
AND FUNDING FOR A NEW GENERATION OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES 
Claire DeWitte* 
PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
As climate change stimulates a rise in sea level, coastal communities 
and islands are experiencing destructive erosion of land and flooding of 
habitation.1  As a result, residents of low-lying communities and small 
islands are, and will continue to be, displaced due to the gradual, steady 
rise of sea level and its associated problems, such as increased 
destruction from flooding and other natural disasters.2  Millions of people 
will lose their homes and livelihoods, forcing them to seek alternative 
shelter within their own country, or cross borders in the hope of finding a 
new home and work.3  Climate change displacement is predicted to affect 
approximately 200 million people by 2050.4  The enormity of climate 
change displacement demands financial resources that vulnerable 
                                            
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. 
 1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 408-
21 (S. Soloman et al. eds. 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_ 
and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I].  
 2. See NORMAN MYERS WITH JENNIFER KENT, CLIMATE INST., ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXODUS: AN EMERGENT CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 134-39 (1995), available at 
http://www.climate.org/PDF/Environmetnal%20Exodus.pdf. 
 3. See Lisa Friedman, Coming Soon: Mass Migrations Spurred by Climate Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/03/02/02 
climatewire-facing-the-specter-of-the-globes-biggest-and--
9919.html?scp=1&sq=Coming%20Soon:%20Mass%20Migrations&st=cse. 
 4. OLI BROWN, MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Int’l Org. for Migration 
Research Series Paper No. 31 2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ 
migration_climate.pdf. 
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populations lack.5  Currently, people displaced by climate change are not 
recognized by international law as a group that receives protection and 
assistance. In contrast, refugees who flee their countries of nationality 
due to persecution on account of, for example, race or religion, gain 
internationally recognized status under the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees.6  In an effort to fill the void, scholars 
have endeavored to redefine “refugee” and “internally displaced persons” 
(IDPs) in light of the climate change catalyst, and propose international 
funding mechanisms to rectify the negative effects of the mass human 
migration.  First, I will outline the current state of sea level rise and the 
projected displacement in developing low-lying coastal communities and 
islands.7  Second, I will analyze new “refugee” and “IDP” definitions and 
possible funding mechanisms. Third, I will argue that the Green Climate 
Fund, born out of the Copenhagen Accord, is an appropriate funding 
mechanism to assist people displaced by climate change; therefore, a 
portion of the Green Climate Fund should be allocated specifically 
toward mitigating forced displacement due to rising sea level.   
PART II:  THE DISAPPEARANCE OF LAND 
A.  Sea Level Rise 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)8 Fourth 
Assessment Report states that there are two key causes of global sea 
level rise: thermal expansion of oceans (water expands as it warms) and 
                                            
 5. KOKO WARNER, CHARLES EHRHART, ALEX DE SHERBININ, SUSANA ADAMS, & 
TRICIA CHAI-ONN, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
ON HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT iv (CARE Int’l 2009) available at 
http://www.care.org/getinvolved/advocacy/pdfs/Migration_Report.pdf [hereinafter IN 
SEARCH OF SHELTER]. 
 6. Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting the Rising Tide: A Proposal for a 
Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 357 (2009); 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 
1967 Protocol]. 
 7. Coastal communities and small islands in developing countries receive the focus 
because of the regions’ high vulnerability to rise in sea level. 
 8. IPCC is a scientific body that was established by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization to “provide the world with a 
clear scientific view on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental 
and socio-economic consequences.”  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm.  
IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.  Id. 
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the loss of land-based ice due to increased melting.9  From 1993 to 2003, 
thermal expansion of oceans and loss of land-based ice are believed to 
have equally contributed to the global rise in sea level.10  Studies have 
shown that since 1961, “the average temperature of the global ocean has 
increased to depths of at least 3,000 meters and that the ocean has been 
absorbing more than 80% of the heat added to the climate system.  Such 
warming causes seawater to expand, contributing to sea level rise.”11  
Historically, sea level rise was stable until the nineteenth century.12  
During the twentieth century, estimates show that the global sea level 
rose at an average rate of 1.7 millimeters annually.13  Since 1993, “sea 
level has been rising at a rate of around three millimeters per year, 
significantly higher than the average during the previous half century.”14  
Sea level is projected to rise at an even faster rate during the twenty-first 
century, with an anticipated four millimeters per year by the 2090s.15   
B.  Areas and Populations of Impact 
Global sea level rise is not geographically uniform.16  Some regions 
are confronted with rates that are five times the global sea level 
average.17  For example, the western Pacific Ocean and eastern Indian 
Ocean are experiencing the highest sea level rise, while sea level is 
dropping in the eastern Pacific Ocean and western Indian Ocean.18  Low-
lying coastal communities and small islands are particularly vulnerable 
to rising sea level.19  Coastal communities, which are very susceptible to 
                                            
 9. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 409. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 5. 
 12. Id. at 409. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 409. 
 16. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 336 (M.L. Parry et al. eds. 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II]. 
 17. “Although regional variability in coastal sea level change had been reported from 
tide gauge analyses . . . the global coverage of satellite altimetry provides unambiguous 
evidence of non-uniform sea level change in open oceans.”  IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP I, supra note 1, at 411. 
 18. Id.  IPCC suggests that the western Pacific and eastern Indian oceans experience 
more substantial sea level rise because they are “regions that exhibit large interannual 
variability associated with ENSO [El Nino – Southern Oscillation]. . . . These spatial 
patterns likely reflect decadal fluctuations rather than long-term trends.”  Id.    
 19. See id. at 408-21. 
214 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
extreme storms, experience “increased coastal inundation, erosion and 
ecosystem losses” due to rising sea level caused by climate change.20  
The IPCC assessment of sea level rise on small islands includes “a 
reduction in island size, particularly in the Pacific . . . sea level rise will 
exacerbate inundation, erosion, and other coastal hazards, threaten vital 
infrastructure,21 settlements and facilities, and thus compromise the 
socio-economic well-being of island communities and states.”22  A 
gradual rise in sea level also increases the risk of sudden flooding and 
vulnerability to catastrophic storms.23  For example, the harsh force of a 
tropical storm “will increase as a consequence of higher mean sea level: 
higher waves will be capable of reaching the original shoreline (defined 
as the shorelines prior to the rise in sea level) and areas further inland 
will become exposed to wave action.”24   Moreover, ecosystems that have 
served to “dissipate the energy of storms” are threatened by rising sea 
level.  For example, coastal mangroves, dense forests of interlacing roots, 
“offer a form of physical protection to coastal systems and populations 
[during storms], are also likely to be affected by [sea level rise].”25  
Humans have often considered coastal land ideal for habitat and 
settlement.26  A movement toward urbanization is “likely to increase 
population densities in low-lying coastal areas; the population living 
within thirty kilometers of the coast is estimated to be growing at twice 
the global average reflecting coastward migration, and GDP growth in 
coastal areas exceeds the national average in many countries.”27  IPCC 
predicts “the coastal population could grow from 1.2 billion people (in 
1990) to 1.8 to 5.2 billion people by the 2080s, depending on 
assumptions about migration.”28  With the increase of coastal population, 
                                            
 20. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317. 
 21. Id. at 689.  “Island infrastructure tends to predominate in coastal locations.  In the 
Caribbean and Pacific islands, more than 50% of the population live within 1.5 km of the 
shore.  Almost without exception, international airports, roads and capital cities in the 
small islands of the Indian and Pacific [o]ceans and the Caribbean are sited along the 
coast, or on tiny coral islands.”  Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 333, 689. 
 24. NICK BROOKS, ROBERT NICHOLLS, & JIM HALL, WBGU, SEA LEVEL RISE: 
COASTAL IMPACTS AND RESPONSES 14, (2006), available at 
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2006_ex03.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 26. 
 26. “Population densities in coastal areas are three times the global mean, and it is 
estimated that 50% of the world’s population will live within 100 km of the coast by 
2030.”  Id. at 1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317. 
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natural coastal landscape has experienced increased agricultural and 
industrial use and an “expansion of economic activity, settlements, urban 
centres and tourist resorts.”29  High population density on coastal lands 
exacerbates the impact of rising sea level.  For example, an increase of 
human activity on coastlines directly impacts “drainage of coastal 
wetlands, deforestation and reclamation, and discharge of sewage, 
fertilisers and contaminants into coastal waters”30 and breaks down 
traditionally protective ecosystems.31  Rising sea level, high coastal 
population, and humans’ increased pressure on coastal ecosystems serve 
as a perfect storm to accelerate and swell the number of humans facing 
permanent displacement.   
A nation’s geographic location and population density are not the 
only factors that determine its vulnerability to the negative effects of 
rising sea level, particularly human displacement.  IPCC stresses that 
“[w]hile physical exposure can significantly influence vulnerability for 
both human populations and natural systems, a lack of adaptive capacity 
is often the most important factor that creates a hotspot of human 
vulnerability.”32  Generally, a nation’s adaptive capacity is measured by 
the development level of the nation.33  For example, “[d]eveloping 
nations may have the political or societal will to protect or relocate 
people who live in low-lying coastal zones, but without the necessary 
financial and other resources/capacities, their vulnerability is much 
greater than that of a developed nation in an identical coastal setting.”34  
Due to financial constraints, developing nations can rely less on the 
“resilience of systems to the immediate impacts of coastal hazards, for 
example the quality of physical infrastructure, the preparedness of 
communities, and the ability of a system to recover from damage 
associated with coastal hazards.”35  Consequently, developing nations 
face the greatest threat of detrimental human displacement due to rising 
sea level. 
a.  The Three Deltas: Ganges-Brahmaputra, Mekong, and Nile 
Bangladesh is frequently cited as a “hotspot” for human 
displacement caused by rising sea level.  Approximately 160 million 
                                            
 29. Id. at 319. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 333. 
 32. Id. at 317. 
 33. Id. 
 34. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 317. 
 35. BROOKS, NICHOLLS, & HALL, supra note 24, at 1. 
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people occupy this flat land that sits just above sea level. 36  The Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers form the world’s largest delta, all 
within Bangladesh’s borders.  The abundance of rivers and deltas 
provide many Bangladeshis with their livelihood and natural resources.37  
Flooding is not a new phenomenon for Bangladesh; however, “climate 
change will accelerate change in this already dynamic environment and 
leave millions of Bangladeshis exposed to increased flooding, severe 
cyclones, and sea level rise impacts.”38  The IPCC anticipates that with a 
one meter rise in sea level, approximately 1,000 square kilometers of 
cultivated land and sea product culturing area is likely to become sea 
marsh and 5,000 square kilometers of Mekong River delta are projected 
to flood.39  Bangladeshis rely mostly on small-scale farming as their 
source for food.40  This projection has direct impact on the habitation of 
Bangladeshis as “even a relatively moderate 10 or 20 centimeters rise in 
sea level could displace millions within the next 15 years.”41  
Displacement is not just a prediction; fifteen years ago, “half of Bhola 
Island in Bangladesh became permanently flooded, leaving homeless 
500,000.”42  To make matters worse, Bangladesh lacks the financial 
capabilities and necessary adaptation abilities to effectively minimize the 
strains on natural resources as displaced Bangladeshis seek protection 
from the looming floods.43  Due to Bangladesh’s “long history of weak 
and corrupt governments,” Bangladeshis cannot depend on their 
government for political and social protection during the upheaval of 
land ownership caused by rising sea level.44       
                                            
 36. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Oct. 19, 2010, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html. 
 37. IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at iv. 
 38. Id. 
 39. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 481. 
 40. Emily Wax, In Flood-Prone Bangladesh, a Future That Floats, WASH. POST, Sep. 
27, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/09/26/AR2007092602582.html. 
 41. Nicki Bennett, Climate Migration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2008, 3:20 PM), 
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/climate-
migration/?scp=1&sq=Climate%20Migration&st=cse. 
 42. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 356. 
 43. See Wax, supra note 40. 
 44. “Farmers who lose land in flooding often fight with neighbors over what is left 
and who owns what after the floodwaters recede.  As a result, land disputes have backed 
up the courts in recent years, accounting for 80 percent of Bangladesh’s legal suits, said 
Atiq Rahman, executive director of the Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies and one 
of the country’s top climate change experts.”  Id. 
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Vietnam, home of the Mekong Delta, faces a displacement projection 
similar to that of its South Asian neighbor, Bangladesh.  A recent report 
indicates that approximately one-third of the Mekong Delta could be lost 
with a three-foot rise in sea level.45  Effectively, 11% of Vietnam’s 
eighty-seven million residents could potentially be displaced by such an 
increase in sea level.46  Because Vietnam has low coastal protection, the 
region is more likely to be damaged from increased flooding.47  The 
Mekong Delta provides half of Vietnam’s rice, 60% of its shrimp 
harvest, and 80% of its fruit crop.48  A rise in sea level will not only force 
coastal residents to migrate, but will affect the entire nation’s food 
production.  The government of Vietnam has started to develop plans to 
respond to the projected Vietnamese displacement,49 but it faces an uphill 
battle. The costs of preventive measures, like building dikes along miles 
of the Mekong Delta, can be debilitating to an already struggling 
economy. 50   
Three major Egyptian cities, Alexandria, Rosetta, and Port Said, 
border the Nile Delta.  The Nile Delta rivals Bangladesh as one of the 
most densely populated regions in the world.51  If sea level rises by fifty 
centimeters, IPCC projects over two million people in the Nile Delta 
region potentially “abandoning their homes” and a “loss of 214,000 
jobs.”52  Taken as a whole, of Egypt’s total population of approximately 
eighty-one million people, twelve million people are expected to be 
displaced due primarily to rising sea level.53  Alexandria, the second 
largest city in Egypt, is at particular risk of infrastructure destruction and 
                                            
 45. Seth Mydans, Vietnam Finds Itself Vulnerable if Sea Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 24, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/world/asia/24delta.html?_r=1& 
scp=1&sq=Vietnam%20Finds%20Itself&st=cse. 
 46. See id. 
 47. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 485. 
 48. IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at 15. 
 49. See Mydans, supra note 45. 
 50. Id. The rise in sea level and the cost of preventive measures “could slow 
Vietnam’s drive to emerge from its postwar poverty and impede its ambitions to become 
one of the region’s economic leaders.  Once again, this nation, which has spent much of 
its history struggling to free itself from foreign domination, finds itself threatened by the 
overpowering outside force.” Id. 
 51. Brown, supra note 4, at 18. 
 52. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 339. 
 53. Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st 
Century, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY BIOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES 609, 611 (2001), available at http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/ 
content/357/1420/609.full.pdf+html. 
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displacement due to rising sea level.54  With a population of 
approximately four million, Alexandria is home to 40% of the nation’s 
industry and extends along a coastal plain for over sixty-three 
kilometers.55  In 1999, M. El Raey of University of Alexandria projected 
that 60% of Alexandria’s population and 56% of its industry would be 
affected by a 0.25 meter increase in sea level rise.56  Similar to Vietnam, 
Egypt strives to implement measures to mitigate the damage of sea level 
rise, like beach nourishment and installing hard structures.57 However, 
the nation faces the high cost of implementation.58  
b.  Disappearing Islands: the Maldives and Tuvalu 
Low-lying islands anticipate complete envelopment of their land, the 
most lasting and detrimental result of the rising water.59  The Maldives 
and Tuvalu serve as illuminating examples of projected total land loss of 
small island nations.  The Maldives is a series of 1,200 atolls in the 
Indian Ocean with the highest point of elevation at 2.4 meters above sea 
level.  Tuvalu is vulnerable to rising sea level as well, with the highest 
point just five meters above sea level.  Male, the capital of the Maldives, 
which is located approximately one kilometer from the coast, may 
experience considerable flooding by 2025.60  To try to prevent the 
ultimate loss of the Maldivian capital, the government constructed a 
three meter high sea wall that surrounds the city.  The Maldives lacked 
the resources to construct the protective wall, which cost approximately 
$63 million, so the government accepted 99% of the needed capital as 
aid from the Japanese government.61  If the rise in sea level does not 
                                            
 54. M. El Raey, Kh. Dewidar, & M. El Hattab, Adaptation to the Impacts of Sea Level 
Rise in Egypt, 12 Climate Res. 117, 118-19 (1999), available at http://www.int-
res.com/articles/cr/12/c012p117.pdf. 
 55. Id. at 118. 
 56. Id.  
 57. The following are examples of “coastal nourishment” and “hard structures” that 
Egypt has considered in order to combat the rise in sea level along the Delta: 1) 
constructing two jetties that are sixty-five meters in length along the west of Alexandria; 
2) extending an existing breakwater along the eastern harbor of Alexandria; 3) 
transporting desert sand to five Alexandria beaches; and 4) reinforcing a sea wall in Abu 
Quir Bay.  Id. at 120. 
 58. Id. at 127. 
 59. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 349. 
 60. Id., supra note 6, at 356.  In 2008, Male’s population was 103,693. 
 61. See Nick Bryant, Maldives: Paradise Soon To Be Lost, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2004, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3930765.stm; Andrew Revkin, 
Maldives Considers Buying Dry Land if Sea Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, available 
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actually cause the total disappearance of the island, the change in sea 
level will likely have major impact on commercial fisheries, which serve 
as “an important contribution to the GDP of many island states.”62  In an 
effort to combat the future loss of land and homes, the Maldives and 
Tuvala governments have called on the international community to assist 
in preventing their nations from ceasing to exist. 63   
PART III:  NEW BREED OF DISPLACEMENT 
A.  Refugee Law 
Currently, international law does not grant protection to people 
displaced due to rising sea level and other environmental dangers64 
caused by climate change.65  In order to receive internationally 
recognized refugee status, a displaced person must fulfill the 
requirements outlined in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and the 1967 
Protocol.66  Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual seeking 
“refugee” status must meet the definition’s three elements.  First, the 
term “refugee” applies “to any person who . . . has . . . a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”67  Second, 
the individual must be “outside the country of his nationality.”68  Third, 
the individual must be “unable or, owing to such fear, . . . unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or . . . , not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, . . . unable or, owing to such fear, . . . 
unwilling to return.”69 
                                                                                                  
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/science/earth/11maldives.html?_r=1&scp=4& 
sq=Maldives%20and%20Japan&st=cse. 
 62. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 689. 
 63. See Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, held by 
the United Nations (Dec. 7-19, 2009), http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/ 
templ/ovw.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=cop15.  
 64. Some possible environmental factors that may force displacement other than 
rising sea level are drought, lack of potable water, land degradation, and lack of natural 
resources. 
 65. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 357. 
 66. 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. 
 67. Id. art. 1(A)(2). 
 68. Id. (emphasis added).  
 69. Id. 
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A displaced person will find it difficult to qualify as a “refugee” 
under this definition due to the “persecution” and “class” elements of the 
definition, thus limiting the number of individuals who successfully find 
legal protection in another country.  Moreover, qualifying for refugee 
status is nearly impossible if the environment is cited as the reason for 
displacement, “[u]nless the environmental degradation is a consequence 
of an armed conflict or there is a mixture of environmental and political 
causes.”70   
If refugee status is successfully granted, international legal 
protections are bestowed on the refugee in his/her new host country, 
including the right to be gainfully employed, receive public education, 
and freedom from refoulement “to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”71  Each signatory country to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
determines the ceiling of accepted refugees each year.72  Effectively, due 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s narrow “refugee” definition and 
limited host countries’ quotas, people who are displaced because of 
climate-induced rising sea level are left without legal protection.73   
As our globe faces the escalation of climate change-induced 
displacement, the definition of “refugee” is looking like “a product of its 
time.”74  The 1951 Refugee Convention was signed during the 
aftershocks of World War II and the predominant source of refugees was 
war-ravaged Europe.”75  Therefore, “[n]ot surprisingly, the definition that 
issued forth from that era reflected Western notions of rights and needs 
                                            
 70. Maria Stavropoulou, Indigenous Peoples Displaced from Their Environment: Is 
There Adequate Protection?, 5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 119 (1994). 
 71. 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 33(1). 
 72. President Obama, for example, has allotted 80,000 slots for refugees in 2010. 
 73. But see Jessica Cooper, Article, Environmental Refugees: Meeting Requirements 
of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 486-87 (1998).  Ms. Cooper makes 
the compelling argument that: 
[E]nvironmental refugees already fit within the 1951 definition.  Using examples 
of environmental crises to demonstrate that governments are responsible for 
environmental degradation and its resulting populations of environmental refugees 
. . . government-induced environmental degradation is a form of persecution . . . 
[and] environmental refugees meet the “for reasons of” requirement of the refugee 
definition, since they are persecuted for reasons of their membership in a social 
group of persons who are politically powerless to protect their environment. 
Id.  
 74. Id. at 482. 
 75. Id. 
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extolled after the persecution of the Second World War.”76  The twenty-
first century has brought catalysts of displacement that the original 1951 
Refugee Convention drafters could not have anticipated.  Recognizing 
the projected magnitude of climate change displacement and the lack of 
an international convention to mitigate and ease the migration, scholars 
have sought to redefine “refugee” in order to incorporate the unique 
needs of climate change displacement. 
B.  Proposals to address climate change displacement – a more precise 
definition 
Over the last twenty-five years, an increasingly heated academic 
debate has focused on possible new definitions for people displaced by 
climate change.  Initially, much of the discourse was guided by “those 
who study . . . the broader class of environmental refugees rather than the 
more specific subset of climate change refugees.”77  For example, in 
1985, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) produced the 
first “environmental refugee” definition: “[t]hose people who have been 
forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, 
because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered 
by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of their life.”78  The debate continued as Myers and Kent, in 
2005, defined an environmental refugee as persons who can no longer 
gain secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of 
environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, 
deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages, climate change, and natural 
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods.79  This definition 
                                            
 76. Id. 
 77. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 363. 
 78. “By ‘environmental disruption’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical 
and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily 
or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.”  Id.  Professor Robert McLeman of the 
University of Ottawa addressed reservations associated with the UNEP’s definition of 
environmental refugee when he stated that “most suggested examples involving 
environmental refugees, such as Darfur or Rwanda, have also been influenced by other 
significant, non-climatic drivers” as well as “deliberate decisions by governments to alter 
environmental conditions (such as populations displaced by flooding of areas upstream of 
China’s Three Gorges dams).”  Robert McLeman, Climate Change Migration, Refugee 
Protection, and Adaptive Capacity-Building, 4 MCGILL INT’L J. SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 
13 (2008). 
 79. Org. for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 13th Economic Forum, Prague, May 
23-27, 2005, Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue 1, (remarks by 
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suggests an  involuntary decision to relocate when “the general 
degradation of a region’s natural environment might lead people to 
decide to seek better fortunes elsewhere.”80   
Biermann and Boas, in “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a 
Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees,” sought to 
narrow the definition in order to focus more on climate change as the 
causal link between natural disruption and forced migration, as opposed 
to general environmental changes.   In their view, “climate refugees” are 
“people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near 
future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural 
environment related to at least one of the three impacts of climate 
change: sea level rise, extreme weather events, and water scarcity.”81  
With continued focus on climate change, in 2009, Docherty and Giannini 
proposed a “climate change refugee” definition that covers sudden and 
gradual disruptions and “acknowledges aggregate human contributions to 
climate change.”82  According to Docherty and Giannini, a “climate 
change refugee” is “an individual who is forced to flee his or her home 
and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as 
the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent 
with climate change to which humans more likely than not 
contributed.”83   
                                                                                                  
Norman Myers), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/ 
2005/05/14488_en.pdf. 
 80. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 364. 
 81. FRANK BIERMANN & INGRID BOAS, PREPARING FOR A WARMER WORLD: TOWARDS 
A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM TO PROTECT CLIMATE REFUGEES 8 (Global Governance 
Project, Global Governance Working Paper No. 33, 2007), available at  
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002952/climate_refugees_globalgovernance_Nov
2007.pdf. 
 82. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 371. 
The recognition of human contribution must work within the parameters of 
existing and evolving science.  Science cannot currently prove the extent to which 
humans contributed to a specific event, but it can determine the likelihood that 
they contributed to a type of disruption.   For example, according to the IPCC, the 
likelihood of human contribution ranges from more likely than not (greater than 
fifty percent) for droughts to very likely (more than ninety percent) for temperature 
increases and sea-level rise.  The proposed climate change refugee definition 
adopts the IPCC’s “more likely than not” standard in order to encompass the range 
of environmental disruptions most commonly associated with climate change and 
related displacement. 
Id. 
 83. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 361.  
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C.  Internally Displaced Persons Law 
The rights and bestowed protections of people who are internally 
displaced by rising sea level has received less focus than people who 
cross borders.  However, academics predict that “[m]ost refugees may 
stay in their countries and regions, especially in the case of coastal 
erosion and sea level rise.  For example, Christian Aid expects that only 
five million refugees will cross international borders.”84  Partly due to 
limited financial resources and support, many displaced persons will not 
be able to migrate great distances.85  Docherty and Giannini argue that 
IDPs should be left out of the climate change refugee definition in order 
to reflect the 1951 Refugee Convention’s current distinction between 
refugees and IDPs, as well as recognizing that “host states, to which 
refugees flee, are more likely to accept outside assistance than are home 
states, which may not want interference from the international 
community.”86  In contrast, other academics, like Biermann and Boas, 
embrace IDPs in their environmental or climate change refugee 
definitions, arguing that there should not be different legal status or 
protection applied “depending on whether the victims of climate change 
have crossed a border.”87     
If IDPs are excluded from the proposed climate change refugee 
definitions intended to protect people displaced due to rising sea level, 
IDPs will not find sufficient protection under current IDP law.   As 
Stephen Castles points out in a United Nations Refugee Agency report, 
“[t]here is no legal or institutional regime specifically designed to protect 
IDPs.”88  Because of the gap in international law, “unless [an IDP’s] state 
consents, the internally displaced also receives no assistance from the 
international community.  Thus, internally displaced persons must seek 
aid from their own state, and, under existing international law, the 
internally displaced largely remain an internal matter for that state to 
address.”89  Striving to create a mandate that would provide protection 
for IDPs, the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly 
                                            
 84. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 14. 
 85. IN SEARCH OF SHELTER, supra note 5, at iv. 
 86. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 369. 
 87. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 8. 
 88. STEPHEN CASTLES, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE DEBATE 9 
(2002), available at http://www3.hants.gov.uk/forced_migration.pdf. 
 89. Patrick L. Schmidt, The Process and Prospects for the U.N. Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement to Become Customary International Law: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 483, 489 (2004). 
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called on Dr. Francis Deng, Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons, to develop a new international 
framework for IDPs.90  Dr. Deng’s work on an international mandate was 
framed in the realization that IDPs assistance falls under state 
sovereignty, because the recipients of aid are by definition internal.91  In 
order to confront the sensitive issue of state sovereignty,92 Dr. Deng 
chose to “approach sovereignty not as a negative concept by which states 
barricade themselves against international scrutiny and involvement, but 
rather as a positive concept entailing responsibility for the protection and 
general welfare of the citizens and of those falling under state 
jurisdiction.”93  In 1998, the United Nations adopted Dr. Deng’s 
proposed mandate, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(Guiding Principles), which serves as the sole international document 
directly addressing the unique plight of people displaced within their 
own nation’s borders.94  While the Guiding Principles “reflect and are 
consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law and 
analogous refugee law,”95 the document lacks binding force on state 
                                            
 90. Id. at 483. 
 91. Francis Mading Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, 5 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 141, 143-44 (2001). 
 92. Deng argues that states may be forced to give up state sovereignty for the 
protection of their citizens: 
Under normal circumstances, states are expected to, and do in fact, discharge those 
responsibilities [for the protection and general welfare of the citizens and those 
falling under state jurisdiction].  If they cannot discharge those responsibilities for 
lack of capacity or resources, they are expected to seek, or at least welcome, 
international assistance.  If, on the other hand, they fail to meet their obligations or 
fail to welcome international assistance, and masses of their people suffer 
humanitarian and human rights tragedies as a result, then they must expect the 
international community to show concern and perhaps even threaten intervention.  
Such intervention could range from persuasive diplomatic intercession, to more 
assertive political and economic measures in the form of sanctions, to coercive 
military intervention, in extreme cases.  It is obvious, therefore, that the best way 
to guarantee state sovereignty is to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty 
towards the citizens and those under state jurisdiction. 
Id. at 144-45. 
 93. Id. at 144. 
 94. Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, U.N. ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., ¶¶ 9-10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
(1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement]. 
 95. Id. ¶ 9. 
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actors.96  Nonetheless, the thirty principles serve as “valuable practicable 
guidance to Governments, other competent authorities, 
intergovernmental organizations and NGOs in their work with internally 
displaced persons.”97 
Similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Guiding Principles are 
not suited to effectively deal with the particular issues of rising sea level 
displacement.  The Guiding Principles define IDPs as: 
[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged 
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border.98   
On first examination of the IDP definition, people displaced due to 
rising sea level may fit within the definition’s limitations.  According to 
the definition, a displaced person is protected if he or she must move 
because of “natural or human made disasters.”  While the Guiding 
Principles do not provide a definition for “disaster,” common use 
suggests a sudden event.99  Accordingly, the United Nations Refugee 
Agency has referred to the following events as “natural disasters” that 
served as catalysts for internal displacement: the 2004 tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and the 2008 cyclone in 
Myanmar.100   The tsunami, earthquake, and cyclone are easily described 
as sudden, disastrous events that immediately produced IDPs due to the 
quick destruction of homes.  Rising sea level could be considered a 
gradual and sudden disaster.  While rising sea level is a gradual 
occurrence, coastal regions that experience a gradual rise in sea level are 
                                            
 96. Deng, supra note 91, at 147.  “[‘The Guiding Principles’] aim is to provide 
practical guidance to all those with a role in addressing the plight of the internally 
displaced.  The idea was that, as a restatement of existing legal norms, the Guiding 
Principles would provide only guidelines for application with a focus on internal 
displacement and would not require formal adoption by the relevant UN agencies.” Id. 
 97. U.N. Refugee Agency, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introductory 
Note (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html. 
 98. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 94, Annex, ¶ 2. 
 99. Webster’s Dictionary defines “disaster” as “2 a) a sudden calamitous event 
producing great material damage, loss, and distress; b) a sudden or great misfortune; c) a 
complete failure.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 643 (3d. ed. 
1993).   
 100. U.N. Refugee Agency, Internally Displaced People:  On the Rise in Their Own 
Land, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
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more vulnerable to sudden, frequent, and detrimental flooding.101  
Therefore, a rise in sea level could be interpreted as a human made 
disaster under the IDP definition. 
The Guiding Principles call for protections for IDPs, like the “right 
to an adequate standard of living”102 and unimpeded access to “the 
medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any 
grounds other than medical ones,”103 that are blanketed in a general right 
of equality and dignity.   Although the Guiding Principles provide 
nations with a blueprint outlining guaranteed rights and protection of 
IDPs, they lack a principle addressing international assistance in times of 
“natural or human made disasters.”  In fact, Guiding Principle 3 places 
responsibility on the home state to provide assistance and protection to 
the internally displaced: “[n]ational authorities have the primary duty and 
responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.”104  The document 
fails to confer an international duty to protect people who are displaced 
within their own borders;105 home states are charged with “facilitating 
durable solutions for their displacement.”106  Climate change-induced sea 
level rise is a global problem.  IDPs’ respective home states are not the 
only contributors to the natural disaster that is causing displacement. 
Therefore, the burden to assist and protect IDPs should not rest solely on 
the shoulders of their national authorities.  With the inclusion of 
Principle 3, the Guiding Principles do not serve as the adequate and 
necessary response for displacement caused by rising sea level.   
D.  Proposed Funding Mechanisms 
Academics have coupled their efforts to redefine “refugee” and 
“IDP” with proposals to mitigate and assist the migration.  For example, 
Docherty and Giannini proposed “a new legal instrument” that would 
“create obligations to deal with both prevention and remediation of the 
climate change refugee problem.”107  They argue for the adoption of an 
independent convention, separate from the 1951 Refugee Convention or 
                                            
 101. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II, supra note 16, at 334. 
 102. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 94, principle 18. 
 103. Id. principle 19. 
 104. Id. principle 3. 
 105. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 18. 
 106. Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Inst., Displacement, 
Natural Disaster, and Human Rights (Oct. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/1017_natural_disasters_ferris.aspx. 
 107. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 6, at 350. 
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the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which 
would accomplish three goals:  
First, the instrument should establish guarantees of human rights 
protections and humanitarian aid for a specific class of people.  
Second, it should spread the burden of fulfilling those guarantees 
across the home state, host state, and international community.  
Finally, it should form institutions to implement the provisions, 
including a global fund, a coordinating agency, and a body of 
scientific experts.108   
Stressing the belief that “there are legal and moral reasons to hold 
those who contributed most to causing the harm responsible for 
mitigating it,”109 Docherty and Giannini proposed a global fund 
consisting of in-kind financial assistance from the international 
community.110  Specifically, the global fund would administer and 
manage the international financial assistance.111  Docherty and Giannini 
argue that the global community will be better able to harness the 
emerging issue of climate change refugees by “pooling all states’ 
resources” with the greater financial burden falling on developed nations 
that have contributed the most to the current warming of the globe.112 
In comparison to Docherty and Giannini’s proposed “new legal 
instrument” and accompanying global fund, Biermann and Boas 
proposed adopting a protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)113  called the “Recognition, 
Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees.”114  This protocol 
would be grounded in the following five principles: planned relocation 
and resettlement, resettlement instead of temporary asylum, collective 
                                            
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 382. 
 110. Id. at 350, 379. 
 111. Id. at 385. 
 112. Id. at 382. 
 113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is an international 
treaty created to address and combat climate change.  The UNFCCC entered into force on 
March 21, 1994, and is ratified by 192 countries.   Under UNFCCC, governments: 
“gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, national policies and best 
practices; launch national strategies for addressing greenhouse gas emissions and 
adapting to expected impacts, including the provision of financial and technological 
support to developing countries; cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change.” U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/2627.php (last visited Aug. 27, 
2010). 
 114. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 26. 
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rights for local populations, international assistance for domestic 
measures, and international burden-sharing.115  In order to achieve the 
five principles, extensive funding is necessary.  Biermann and Boas 
suggest that the appropriate funding apparatus is a separate fund 
dedicated to the particular needs of climate refugees.116  The proposed 
Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund would be entirely 
grant-based.117  To that end, if “larger development projects financed 
through loans include the resettlement of climate refugees, the particular 
costs of the resettlement elements will be fully reimbursed as a grant.”118  
In order to avoid rivalry with “other sustainable development needs” in 
the UNFCCC,119 the Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund 
would be funded by new and additional capital.120  Developing countries 
that incur costs to protect and relocate climate change refugees due to sea 
level rise will receive reimbursement for their incremental costs through 
the Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund.121  The proposed 
UNFCCC Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of 
Climate Refugees will provide its member parties or affiliated 
committees with the authority to create and manage “a list of designated 
populations as ‘climate refugees in need of relocation,’” in order to 
properly “determine the amount of reimbursement and type of assistance, 
and to take all other measures related to the governance of the fund.”122 
Though academics have different approaches, the proposals 
discussed above find common ground in the belief that rising sea level 
and displacement are global problems that require committed 
                                            
 115. Id. at 25-26. 
 116. Id. at 29. 
 117. Id. at 30. 
 118. Id.  
 119. The UNFCCC has already established a funding mechanism that manages and 
distributes financial assistance to developing countries combating the effects of climate 
change.  The Special Climate Change Fund was created in 2001, and finances 
“[a]daptation, . . . [t]ransfer of technologies, . . . [e]nergy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste management . . . [and] [a]ctivities to assist developing country Parties . 
. . in diversifying their economies . . . .”  U.N. FRAMEWORK CONV. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
Report on the Conference of the Parties of the Seventh Session Held at Marrakesh From 
29 October to 10 November 2001, 44, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 
2002), available at 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/special_climate_change_
fund/items/3657.php.  
 120. BIERMANN & BOAS, supra note 81, at 30. 
 121. Id.  Additionally, a “large part of th[is] financial transfer will be channelled 
through international relief agencies and . . . these agencies will then be entitled to 
reclaim their costs” from the fund.  Id.  
 122. Id.  
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international cooperation to truly combat their effects.  This 
understanding of the global nature of the problem is reflected in 
emerging international efforts to set guidelines for climate change 
prevention.  The most recent attempt to reach international agreement 
occurred at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
PART IV:  THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE 
From December 7, 2009 to December 18, 2009, delegates from 193 
countries met in Copenhagen, Denmark, for a United Nations summit on 
climate change. The Copenhagen Conference was charged with the task 
of developing a new international agreement to be implemented after the 
expiration of the Kyoto Protocol123 in 2012.124  The delegates endeavored 
to unify nations in constructive steps that would collectively combat the 
current effects of global warming and preempt future harms.125  
                                            
 123. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 
2005).  The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that:  
[S]ets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community 
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. . . . Recognizing that developed 
countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions 
in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the 
Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities.” 
Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC (Nov. 19, 2010, 2:15 PM), 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.  The United States is a signatory of the 
Kyoto Protocol, but has never ratified the international agreement.  See UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol: Status of Ratification (2009), 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratificatio
n_20091203.pdf.  
 124. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Fact Sheet: 10 
Frequently Asked Questions About the Copenhagen Deal 1 (2009), 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/fact_sheets/application/pdf/10_faqs_copenhagen_deal.pdf 
(last updated November 2009). 
 125. Specifically, there are four key issues the delegates at the Copenhagen Conference 
needed to provide clarity for: 
The [sic] first is clarity on the mid-term emission reduction targets that 
industrialized countries will commit to.  Second, there must be clarity on the 
actions that developing countries could undertake to limit their greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Third, it must define stable and predictable financing to help the 
developing world reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the inevitable 
effects of climate.  And finally, it must identify institutions that will allow 
technology and finance to be deployed in a way that treats the developing 
countries as equal partners in the decision-making process.  
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Unfortunately, establishing an amalgamated voice that incorporates 
diverse interests and needs is a difficult task.  The Copenhagen 
Conference was weighed down with contentious talks that exemplified 
the immense difficulty “to forge consensus among the disparate blocs of 
countries fighting over environmental guilt, future costs and who should 
referee the results.”126   
Many delegates from developing nations, the most vulnerable to 
climate change, were not included in negotiations between highly 
developed and influential countries, such as the United States, China, and 
India.127  Small island nations attended the Copenhagen Conference as a 
united front to advocate for their citizens who are losing their homes and 
livelihood to rising sea level.  During a panel entitled “Sinking Islands, 
the Pacific Voice,” a delegate from the Solomon Islands described the 
struggles climate change refugees face and stressed the need for support 
from developed nations. She emphatically stated:  
Increasing sea level rise, unpredictable weather, increasing 
temperature—any of which describe climate change—but for 
me, climate change is losing my island.  Today, I witnessed 
washing away of my shoreline, my island slowly sinking.  
Today, I witnessed culture threat.  Today, I witnessed people of 
my island moving to another island . . . .  Sea level rise is forcing 
my people to migrate . . . .  My question today is can the world 
leaders support our leaders, because that is where our survival 
lies.128 
Repeatedly, delegates from Papa New Guinea, Tonga, Republic of 
Palau, and other low-lying island nations stressed the urgency for 
assistance in the face of rising sea level.  To illustrate the pending 
upheaval, the President of Palau described the rising sea level as a 
“tsunami moving in slow motion vertically from the bottom up to 
                                                                                                  
Id. 
 126. Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/ 
earth/20accord.html?scp=1&sq=a%20grudging%20accord%20in%20climate%20talks&s
t=cse. 
 127. John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/ 
earth/19climate.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Many%20goals%20remain%20unmet%20in%20
5%20nations’%20climate%20deal&st=cse.  
 128. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “Sinking 
Islands, the Pacific Voice – 1.5 to stay alive,” held by the United Nations (Dec. 7-19, 
2009), http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession= 
2583&theme=cop15. 
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eventually swallow the low-lying islands which will be forever washed 
out from the face of the earth.”129  Despite the numerous pleas for 
international assistance, the Copenhagen Conference concluded without 
the delegates committing to a legally binding international agreement.  
Instead, the outcome of the Conference was the Copenhagen Accord,130 
an agreement that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon described as “the first 
truly global agreement that will limit and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, support adaptation for the most vulnerable and launch a new 
era of green growth.”131  Participating nations recognized the 
Copenhagen Accord by consensus,132 but failed to make it a binding 
international treaty with the ability to enforce the terms agreed to at the 
conference.133  Some delegates were “disappointed that the  . . . [Accord] 
lacked so many elements they considered crucial, including firm targets 
for mid- or long-term reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and a 
deadline for concluding a binding treaty next year.”134  However, as U.S. 
President Barack Obama noted, “for the first time in history all major 
economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take 
action to confront the threat of climate change,”135 a fact that should not 
be lost amidst the disappointment over the Accord’s shortcomings. 
Despite the concerns that the Copenhagen Accord lacks teeth, 
developed nations did pledge financial support to a fund which will assist 
developing nations in their efforts to address the effects of climate 
change.136  The Copenhagen Accord states:  
                                            
 129. Webcast: United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, “LAST 
CHANCE! Pacific island leaders call to keep us alive!,” held by the United Nations (Dec. 
7-19, 2009), http://webcast.cop15.dk/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kong 
resssession=2625&theme=cop15. 
 130. Copenhagen Accord, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2009, ___ U.N.T.S. ____, 
available at http://www.denmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C41B62AB-4688-4ACE-BB7B-
F6D2C8AAEC20/0/copenhagen_accord.pdf.   
 131. Climate change deal marks an ‘essential beginning,’ Ban says, UN NEWS 
SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=33305. 
 132. Id.  
 133. James Kanter, Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money 
Flowing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/21/business/energy-environment/21iht-
green21.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Copenhagen’s%20one%20real%20accomplishment&st=
cse. 
 134. Revkin & Broder, supra note 126.  
 135. Obama’s Remarks on the Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/19climate.text.html?_r=1 
&scp=1&sq=Obama’s%20Remarks%20on%20the%20Climate%20Agreeemnt&st=cse. 
 136. Kanter, supra note 133. 
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[T]he collective commitment by developed countries to provide 
new and additional resources, including forestry and investments 
through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion 
for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between 
adaptation and mitigation . . . In the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, 
developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 
100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developed countries.137    
The Copenhagen Accord calls for the establishment of the 
Copenhagen Green Climate Fund,  which will serve as  an “operating 
entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, 
programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related 
to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building, 
technology development and transfer.”138  Notably, the pledged financial 
support signifies recognition from developed nations that financial 
capital needs to be dedicated to developing nations, who have 
contributed least to the global warming catastrophe, and yet, have 
suffered the most.139  Who will receive the funds, how the funds will be 
allocated to the varying climate change issues, and the structure of 
reporting systems has not been determined.140 
A.  Allocation of Funds for Climate Change Displacement 
The United Nations and the signatories of the Copenhagen Accord 
intend for financial support to be distributed to developing nations within 
the year.  The Copenhagen Accord calls for a “fast-start” fund valued at 
$10 billion annually that is to be dispersed from 2010 to 2012, before 
$100 billion is contributed annually by 2020.141  In line with this goal, the 
United Nations commenced a high level panel,142 the Advisory Group on 
Climate Change Financing, to “design and oversee a $100 billion annual 
fund for climate mitigation and adaptation financing in poor 
                                            
 137. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 8.  
 138. Id. ¶ 10. 
 139. Revkin & Broder, supra note 126. 
 140. See Climate Change deal marks an ‘essential beginning,’ Ban says, supra note 
131. 
 141. Kanter, supra note 133. 
 142. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 9.  
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countries.”143  In determining the allocation of financial resources from 
the Green Climate Fund, the Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Financing must ensure that a significant portion of the financial support 
is dedicated to preventing and mitigating human displacement caused by 
rising sea level. 
As discussed earlier, climate change refugees144 are not bestowed 
legal protection and assistance under refugee and IDP law.  Until there is 
an internationally recognized definition of climate change refugee, and 
possibly a new United Nations Convention that focuses on this 
population’s unique needs, financial assistance must be derived from a 
different international funding mechanism.  As echoed by the 
Copenhagen Conference panelists from the Pacific island nations that are 
facing total envelopment,145 the dire situation requires immediate 
international cooperation and response.  Thus, the international 
community must utilize the current climate change mitigation funding 
mechanism, the Copenhagen Accord, to confront sea level rise 
displacement.  As discussed in Part III, Section C, theorists and 
academics argue that the appropriate funding mechanism must embrace 
the principle of international burden sharing, because “[c]limate change 
is a global problem in causation and consequences, and the industrialized 
countries bear most of the moral responsibility for its victims.”146  The 
Copenhagen Accord reflects this principle when it emphasizes that the 
effort to combat climate change must be made “in accordance with the 
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principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”147   
Beyond the articulation of an international burden sharing principle, 
the Copenhagen Accord contains the concrete objective of “stabiliz[ing] 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere,” which would require a 
global temperature rise of less than two degrees Celsius.148  Allocating 
financial resources to developing nations to specifically confront human 
displacement from sea level rise is crucial to satisfying the Copenhagen 
Accord’s objectives of capping global temperature rise and implementing 
adaptation actions to reduce vulnerability and build resilience in 
developing nations.  The following factors support the argument that 
combating the negative effects of climate change requires mitigation and 
protection of climate change refugees: security and conflict, exasperation 
of environmental issues in host and home countries, and cultural 
survival.   
a.  Security and Conflict 
As people are forced to relocate within their home country or cross 
borders to seek refuge in host countries, risk to security and violent 
conflict is heightened.149  Though empirical studies are lacking, 
academics predict that “climate-related stresses will increase competition 
between groups for increasingly scarce resources, in turn raising the 
potential for violent conflict and refugee movements.”150  Developing 
countries, like Bangladesh and Vietnam, endure on limited resources as 
is; climate change refugees are expected “to put even further strains on 
scarce water, energy and food resources.”151  To make matters worse, in 
Bangladesh, rise in sea level is anticipated to wipe out vital cultivated 
land, with “rice production . . . expected to drop 10 percent and wheat 
production by 30 percent” by 2050.152 Moreover, human sustenance, may 
be challenged as individuals who previously relied for nourishment on 
                                            
 147. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 130, ¶ 1. 
 148. Id. 
 149. JON BARNETT & NEIL ADGER, SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS AN 
IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING, HUMAN SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, AN 
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, 2 (June 20-21, 2005), http://www.gechs.org/ 
downloads/holmen/Barnett_Adger.pdf. 
 150. McLeman, supra note 78, at 9-10. 
 151. Joanna Kakissis, Environmental Refugees Unable to Return Home, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/asia/ 
04migrants.html. 
 152. Friedman, supra note 3. 
2010] At the Water’s Edge 235 
 
the bounty from the sea are forced to look inland after the coastal land is 
eroded or disappears, thus altering the allocation of natural resources.  
Natural resources induced conflict is not a new phenomenon, as 
exemplified by violence motivated by dwindling oil resources.153 
Developing countries, which will primarily serve as home or host 
countries to individuals displaced by rising sea level, have less adaptive 
capacity to deal with the influx of population.154  A developing country’s 
ability to provide state entitlements or services will be challenged due to 
the lack of financial resources available to adapt to the changing 
demographics.  Serving the needs of displaced individuals will put an 
additional strain on the home or host country, which could “tip poor 
countries into fragile states and fragile states into failed states.”155  In 
“Security and Climate Change: Towards an Improved Understanding,” 
Barnett and Adger argue that “a common factor in many internal wars is 
that armed groups are comprised of young men whose expectations for a 
better life have been frustrated due to contractions in their livelihood.”156  
An individual’s choice to take up arms may be a response to sudden 
poverty coupled with a real or perceived insecurity of the future.157   
For the displaced who cross national borders, Myers notes in remarks 
entitled “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue” that 
there are “limits to host countries’ capacity, let alone willingness to take 
in outsiders.”158  Refugees frequently face hostility in host countries as 
they can be viewed as “threat[ening] social cohesion and national 
identity,” thus becoming “an excuse for outbreaks of ethnic tension and 
civil disorder, even political upheaval.”159  Castles argues that “forced 
movements of population are increasingly perceived as a major factor in 
generating conflicts between states and the use of force.” 160  To combat 
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the steady flood of climate change refugees from Bangladesh, India is 
“building a fence much like the one along the U.S.-Mexico border to 
keep illegal immigrants out.”161  In sum, the possibility for security risk 
and conflict will increase as populations are displaced by sea level rise 
and seek refuge in new locations.  As a result, the collective objectives of 
the Copenhagen Accord will be hindered by amplified armed conflict 
and security issues within and across nation state borders.   
b.  Exasperation of Environmental Issues 
As sea level rises, residents of coastal communities will gradually 
move inland as their land is eroded, disappears, or can no longer be 
cultivated.   The resulting food and water scarcity “will accelerate the 
dramatic rural-urban drift in the developing world” as climate change 
refugees travel to cities to find new job opportunities and livelihoods.162  
In vulnerable Bangladesh, many climate change refugees may move to 
the mega-city of Dhaka, where 3.4 million people already live in 
slums.163  Dhaka, a city that is already “bursting at the seams,” will swell 
even more with the inundation from climate change refugees.164  Not 
only will the new urban residents be vying for scarce resources in Dhaka, 
but the influx of people will also contribute to the mega city’s negative 
environmental impact.  Currently, “cities draw together many of Earth’s 
major environmental problems: population growth, pollution, resource 
degradation and waste generation.”165  If cities, like Dhaka, are not 
equipped to accept and mitigate the prospective population increase due 
to the rise in sea level, the cities’ current environmental problems will be 
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exasperated, thus working against the objectives of the Copenhagen 
Accord.  
c.  Cultural Survival 
The envelopment of small island nations is accompanied by the 
potential loss of cultures. At the Copenhagen Conference, delegates from 
small Pacific islands described their expectation of total loss of their 
island nations if swift action was not taken to combat climate change.166  
Specifically, a student delegate from the Solomon Islands spoke of the 
anticipated loss of her culture and people if the international community 
fails to act urgently and with purpose.167    The survival of all cultures is 
intrinsically valuable to the global community.  While there may not be a 
direct link between the endurance of cultures and the Copenhagen 
Accord’s ultimate objective of “stabiliz[ing] greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”168 the international 
agreement will fail if cultures are allowed to dissipate with the loss of 
coastal land.    
PART V:  CONCLUSION 
Climate change-induced rising sea level is a reality for low-lying 
coastal communities and islands.  Millions of coastal residents in 
developing countries will be forced to seek livelihoods in new 
communities within their country’s borders or beyond.  Due to the lack 
of an internationally recognized definition and funding mechanism, 
climate change refugees currently face, and will continue to face, forced 
migration without legal protection and financial assistance.  Confronted 
with this dire situation, the international community must act urgently to 
prevent and mitigate the displacement of millions of vulnerable climate 
change refugees.  The developed nations’ pledged funds in the 
Copenhagen Accord should be allocated to serve this pending upheaval.  
The Copenhagen Accord is not perfect.  Although over 120 countries 
have agreed to the Accord, it remains legally unenforceable.  In the long 
term, $100 billion will probably fall short of the capital needed to truly 
combat the myriad effects of climate change.  Despite these problems, 
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the international community, through the Copenhagen Accord, has 
acknowledged that climate change requires a global response that reflects 
the appropriate burden-sharing among nations.  In turn, the international 
community must utilize its financial resources to combat the pending 
forced migration of millions of climate change refugees. 
 
 
 
